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Abstract
We study the relevance of the cross-sided externality between liquidity makers
and takers from the two-sided market perspective. We use exogenous changes in the
make/take fee structure, minimum tick-size and technological shocks for liquidity
takers and makers, as experiments to identify cross-sided complementarities between
liquidity makers and takers in the U.S. equity market. We find that the externality
is on average positive, but it decreases with adverse selection. We quantify the
economic significance of the externality by evaluating an exchange’s revenue after a
make/take fee change.
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1 Introduction
The interaction among economic agents, either direct or indirect, forms the foundation
of economic theory. The structure of a market determines the degree of this interaction.
A two-sided market is one with an intermediary or platform that enables interactions
between two sets of agents, and the decisions of each set of agents affect the outcome of
the other group through some form of network and membership externality (see Rochet
and Tirole, 2006; Rysman, 2009). In some cases, while not losing money overall, the
intermediary appropriately charges or rewards each set of agents to entice them to the
platform. An example of a two-sided market is a “Ladies’ night,” where a nightclub (a
platform for gentlemen and ladies to meet each other) exempts female patrons (one set
of agents) from paying cover charges and provides them free drinks, while male patrons
(the other set of agents) are charged a fee. The externality that more female patrons will
attract more male patrons, in turn attracting more female patrons, makes the platform
more attractive and thus profitable. Although the platform subsidizes the female patrons
(a money-losing strategy), the overall profitability of the platform can be positive because
of the network externality. Thus identifying the network externality has important pricing
implications for the platform, because it determines how the platform sets prices for both
sides of the market.
This paper empirically investigates the economics of two-sidedness in financial markets
by identifying a new network externality and by evaluating the pricing effectiveness of
a trading platform.1 In particular, we empirically identify the cross-sided externality
between liquidity consumption and provision. We address the issue of identification by
using two exogenous instruments, a fee change and a technological shock in a trading
1A two-sided market is different from the two-sided trading in Sarkar and Schwartz (2009), who
propose a new liquidity measure called “sidedness”, using the linear dependence between seller- and
buyer-initiated trades. They define two-sidedness as the negative correlation and one-sidedness as the
positive correlation between the buyer- and seller-initiated trades. By two-sided market, we refer to a
setting where a platform or an intermediary courts buyers and sellers, accounting for the externality
between the buyers and sellers.
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platform. Using the estimated cross-sided externality, we evaluate the pricing strategy of a
U.S. trading platform and economically quantify the cross-sided liquidity externality. Our
paper is the first in the financial economics literature to empirically study the economic
implications of a two-sided market.2 Our work is important for trading venues that are
attempting to understand the effectiveness of their pricing strategies. It is also important
for regulators, who evaluate how alterations of make/take fees by trading venues might
affect market quality from a social optimum perspective, in making decisions on related
financial regulations. In addition this paper sheds light on the way the order-posting
behavior of liquidity demanders and suppliers is interrelated and contributes to the on-
going policy debate on the maker/taker practices in U.S. equity markets.
The first model that applies the two-sided market setup to financial markets is Fou-
cault, Kadan, and Kandel (2013). They introduce a new type of liquidity externality
(cross-sided) between liquidity makers and takers, according to which an increase in the
monitoring intensity of liquidity makers induces a positive externality on liquidity takers,
thereby increasing the speed of liquidity consumption. This induced increase in turn af-
fects the actions of liquidity makers and begets liquidity supply, giving rise to liquidity
cycles. A positive cross-sided liquidity externality exists because it is beneficial for liquid-
ity makers and takers to find each other. The model explains the widespread adoption of
maker/taker pricing and that presents a rationale for differentiating trading fees between
liquidity makers (liquidity suppliers) and takers (liquidity demanders).
However, negative cross-sided liquidity externalities can exist if liquidity makers and
takers incur a cost from meeting one another. For example, such a cost can occur if
makers face information uncertainty or are afraid of being adversely selected by takers.
In today’s markets liquidity makers rarely have obligations to provide liquidity, and they
2Studies on two-sided markets are more common in the empirical industrial organization and market-
ing science literature. Empirical work in these literatures focuses on two-sided markets such as: operating
systems, dating service, credit card, game console media, and advertising markets among many others,
(see Rysman, 2009, for references).
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might refrain from providing liquidity after trades, thereby leading to a negative liquidity
externality.3 If a venue alters its take fee to entice more takers, makers concerned about
execution certainty and speed of execution might withdraw their liquidity provision to
become takers, when the overall cost of posting a market order is lower. Thus the existence
and the sign of cross-sided liquidity externalities are unclear and remain an empirical
question.
We investigate and identify the cross-sided liquidity externality using a set of high
quality and detailed limit order book (LOB) data from the NASDAQ OMX BX, formerly
known as Boston Stock Exchange (BX hereafter).4 The excellent data quality and the
existence of a technological shock and a fee change that affect only liquidity consumption
in BX provide an ideal setup for identifying cross-sided externalities. To measure the
speed of liquidity consumption and provision, we build the LOB for all points in time
with microsecond accuracy and construct measures of the time it takes for liquidity to
replenish (make cycle) after periods of liquidity consumption (take cycle), consistent with
Biais, Hillion, and Spatt (1995) and Foucault et al. (2013). We measure make cycles as
the time taken for restoring liquidity after a series of aggressive liquidity depleting market
orders and take cycles as the time it takes for a series of market orders to deplete the
liquidity. Thus, we can view make cycles as an alternative model-free measure of resiliency
for a limit order market to the popular model-specific Vector Autoregressive model (VAR)
approach to measuring resiliency in Coppejans, Domowitz, and Madhavan (2004).
The make and take cycles over the sample period exhibit strong positive correlation
at the intraday and daily level. We find that the duration of make cycles is significantly
longer than the duration of take cycles. The average make cycle is 631 seconds, while the
3Senator Kaufman has expressed concerns about the voluntary liquidity provision role of high-
frequency trading and statistical arbitrage firms for a large proportion of the U.S. market. He suggests
that the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) should impose liquidity provision obligations on
high-frequency traders (see www.sec.gov/comments/s7-27-09/s72709-96.pdf).
4NASDAQ OMX completed the acquisition of the Boston Stock Exchange on August 29, 2008. On
January 16, 2009, NASDAQ OMX launched NASDAQ OMX BX.
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average take cycle is 62 seconds. Liquidity cycles exhibit an intraday pattern where the
cycles are shorter at the beginning and at the end of the day, and longer in the middle
of the day. This pattern is consistent with the trading volume pattern in Admati and
Pfleiderer (1988). In addition, both make and take cycles are shorter for larger stocks and
for stocks with higher trading activity.
We use the Foucault et al. (2013) model to guide our identification strategy. To estab-
lish causality and to identify the cross-sided liquidity externality, we study two exogenous
events that should affect the monitoring intensity of market takers through a reduction
in their monitoring costs. First, we use an increase in the takers’ rebate as an instrument
for the speed of reaction to trading opportunities for liquidity demanders.5 An increase in
the taker’s rebate directly incentivizes liquidity demanders (but not liquidity providers)
to increase their monitoring intensities, which should decrease take cycles. Second, we use
a technology shock that reduces the monitoring cost (and thus increases the monitoring
intensity) of the taker side. Because the exogenous shocks directly affect only the take
cycle, we can use them to identify the cross-sided liquidity externality and the causal
effect of take cycles on make cycles.
We use an instrumental variable (IV) regression for the sample period: October 1,
2010 through March 31, 2011. The IV regression with fixed effects allows us to pin down
causality and to account for confounding effects, market wide effects, and potential esti-
mation problems. We identify a positive liquidity externality between liquidity providers
and takers. In particular, we find that an increase in the taker rebate increases the takers’
response speed to changes in liquidity and decreases take cycles. Consequently, there is
an increased intensity of market orders, which consume the liquidity available at the best
quotes and which lead to wider bid-ask spreads. This drop in liquidity, which increases
the number of profit opportunities for liquidity makers, attracts more liquidity suppliers,
5In BX, differently from most trading venues, there is a rebate for taking liquidity, and a fee is paid
for filling the limit order book for NASDAQ- and NYSE-listed stocks.
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who post new aggressive limit orders that replenish liquidity. The new best prices in turn
create new trading opportunities for liquidity takers. Thus the analysis using the first
instrument, the increase in the taker rebate, shows that cross-sided liquidity externalities
are positive, i.e. liquidity demand begets liquidity supply. This result is further sub-
stantiated by our second instrument, a technological change that reduces the monitoring
cost and improves the monitoring ability of liquidity takers, which naturally reduces the
duration of take cycles. Using the technological change as an instrument, we find that
a reduction in the duration of taker liquidity cycles causes a decrease in the duration of
maker liquidity cycles. When we use an alternative estimation strategy of a two-sample,
or split sample, IV estimator to address any potential concerns about weak instruments,
our results remain qualitatively similar.6 Our results are also robust to various ways of
measuring make/take cycles.
Although we find that on average liquidity demand begets liquidity supply, we also
find some empirical evidence that negative liquidity externalities exist because of adverse-
selection risk. By sorting the sample into groups based on different proxies for pick-off risk
(market capitalization, relative spread, and return volatility), we find that the magnitude
of the cross-sided externalities for stocks with smallest relative spread and largest volatility
and market capitalization is smaller relative to other stocks. This suggests that both
effects of liquidity demand begets liquidity supply and pick-off risk are at play but the
effect of the former dominates the latter.
Our sample period lies in the period after the introduction of Regulation National
Market System (RegNMS), when the U.S. equity market is highly fragmented. To ad-
dress concerns related to the effect of market fragmentation on our findings, we construct
measures that proxy for make/take cycles for the whole market based on Trade and Quote
6In the split sample two-stage least square, we randomly divide our sample and use one half to
estimate parameters of the first-stage equation. We then use the estimated first-stage parameters to
construct fitted values and estimate the second stage from the other half of the sample.
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(TAQ) data. We use these proxies as robustness to study two exogenous events in periods
when the U.S. market is less fragmented. We exploit staggered introductions of Auto-
quote by the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) in 2003, a technology that reduces the
monitoring cost of market makers and make cycle, to identify the existence and sign of
the cross-sided externality.7 In addition, we also study the reduction of minimum tick
size by NYSE in 2001, which reduces the incentive of market maker to monitor the mar-
ket. We find evidence that liquidity supply begets liquidity demand, consistent with our
earlier results, in environments with less market fragmentation and higher marginal costs
of monitoring.
Using the estimated cross-sided externality, we highlight its economic importance and
significance by evaluating a make/take fee change in BX, where the take rebate increases
from one cent to two cents per hundred shares. The change in pricing increases liquidity
consumption, which in turn induces more liquidity provision. However, the increase in
revenue from the increased trading rate is exceeded by the loss in revenue from the in-
creased subsidization for liquidity demanders. Overall the estimated drop in revenue is
about $770,000 per year for the exchange after the fee change and the estimated economic
significance of the cross-sided externality is $200,000 per year. Our result highlights the
importance of appropriately accounting for cross-sided liquidity externality in trading
venues’ pricing strategies.
Our paper contributes to the participation externality literature that studies whether
the entry of additional investors in a market exerts an externality on other investors
(see Mendelson, 1982, 1985, 1987; Pagano, 1989; Hendershott and Mendelson, 2000).
Our work contributes to this literature as the first empirical paper that investigates how
participation of liquidity demanders affects the participation of liquidity providers and
7Hendershott, Jones, and Menkveld (2011) study the impact of algorithmic trading on market liquidity
using this empirical setup. They provide a detailed documentation about the introduction of Autoquote
and the validity of instrumental variables based on Autoquote.
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that economically quantifies this participation externality.
We join the handful of papers that identify the presence of liquidity externalities in
financial markets. Amihud, Mendelson, and Lauterbach (1997) document how a change in
trading mechanisms improves liquidity not only for affected stocks but also for correlated
non-affected stocks. Barclay and Hendershott (2004) examine how the large differences in
the amount of informed trading between regular trading hours and off-exchange trading
hours affect adverse selection costs. Hendershott and Jones (2005) study how the reduc-
tion of transparency in one market affects the trading cost in other trading venues where
transparency does not change. Bessembinder, Maxwell, and Venkataraman (2006) show
how the introduction of transaction reporting for corporate bonds through TRACE on a
subset of bonds also decreases the trading cost of non-TRACE-eligible bonds. Differently
from work in this literature, which focuses on liquidity externalities related to trading
costs across assets, this paper is the first to examine the cross-sided externalities related
to the provision and consumption of liquidity.
While our paper focuses on two-sided markets and the identification of the liquid-
ity externality between liquidity provision and consumption, it is also related to papers
studying the impact of make/take fees on market quality. Colliard and Foucault (2012)
analyze a microstructure model with make/take fees, where investors can choose to be
makers or takers when deciding how to execute their trades. In a related paper, Malinova
and Park (2011) empirically study the impact of a change in both the make and the take
fee schedule on market quality of 60 cross-listed stocks in the Toronto Stock Exchange.
Battalio, Shkilko, and Ness (2012) show that the cost of liquidity in pay-for-order flow
and in maker/taker exchanges is similar when one takes the make fee rebates into account.
In contrast, our paper sheds light on the way the order posting behavior of makers and
takers is interrelated and contributes to the ongoing policy debate on the maker/taker
practices in U.S. equity markets. In addition, we study the economic effectiveness and
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profitability of the pricing strategy of a U.S. exchange.
Resiliency, the ability of the limit order book (LOB) to revert to its normal shape
promptly after large trades, is an under-studied but important measure of liquidity es-
pecially in today’s electronic LOB markets. In a dealership market, the resiliency of the
market is always high because the designated market marker has the obligation to provide
liquidity. However, the change in market structure towards LOB in recent years, where
there is little obligation for liquidity provision among LOB market makers, points to the
need for measuring and understanding the resiliency dimension of liquidity.8 We join the
theoretical work of Foucault, Kadan, and Kandel (2005); Goettler, Parlour, and Rajan
(2005); Ros´u (2009, 2010), and Foucault et al. (2013) and the empirical work of Biais
et al. (1995); Coppejans et al. (2004); Degryse et al. (2005), and Large (2007) in studying
how the LOB replenishes after trades. We contribute to the literature with a new and
model-free measure of resiliency. In contrast to the empirical papers in this literature,
which focus on measuring resiliency in terms of how long it takes for the LOB to replen-
ish after an event, our results suggest that the cycles of depletion and replenishment are
endogenous and should be studied together when measuring and discussing resiliency.
2 Cross-sided Liquidity Externality
Foucault et al. (2013) develop a model of trading, with specialized market making and
taking sides, in which the speed of reaction to trading opportunities for market makers and
takers is endogenous. They interpret the market-making side as proprietary trading firms
that specialize in high-frequency market making and the market-taking side as brokers
using smart order routers to execute market orders when liquidity is ample and the cost of
8The recent episode of “flash crash,” introduction of maker/taker pricing structure, introduction
of innovations of new trading products and services offered by competing trading venues, and a shift
towards automation in trading has led regulators, politicians, and market participants to question the
new dynamic relation between liquidity providers and demanders in an environment without obligatory
liquidity provision responsibility.
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trading is low. They show that the maker/taker pricing model allows the trading platform
to minimize the duration of liquidity cycles and therefore maximize its expected profit.
Foucault et al. (2013) define liquidity cycles as consisting of two phases: “make liq-
uidity” and “take liquidity.” A “make liquidity” phase (make cycle) is the period when
liquidity suppliers (makers) compete to provide liquidity after a trade. A “take liquidity”
phase (take cycle) is the period when liquidity demanders (takers) compete to consume
liquidity (see Figure 1). Thus a fluid trading process with short liquidity cycles requires
makers to aggressively compete for providing liquidity when liquidity is low, and takers
to consume liquidity when it is available at favorable prices. The liquidity cycle is a time-
dimension measure of liquidity analogous to the liquidity measure of resiliency (Harris,
1990).
Figure 1
Flows of Events in a Cycle (Foucault et al., 2013)
 
Market‐takers submit market 
orders. Trade takes place. 
Liquidity was consumed and 
become sparse. Bid‐ask spread 
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orders in sparse‐liquidity state. 
Bid‐ask spread narrows as 
market moves into a state with 
ample liquidity. 
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In Foucault et al.’s (2013) model, where make/take fee, monitoring cost, and the
number of takers and makers are exogenous, make/take fees and monitoring costs affect
the gains from trade of liquidity makers and takers, while the number of makers (takers)
affects the competition for supplying (consuming) liquidity. One implication of the model
is that changes in fee structures, monitoring costs, and the number of market makers
and takers will affect the monitoring intensities of makers and takers and the make/take
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cycles. Because the speed of reaction to trading opportunities is endogenous, an increase
in monitoring intensity of liquidity makers (takers) will increase the monitoring intensity
of takers (makers). This reinforcing effect between makers and takers implies that an
improvement in the monitoring technology for either makers or takers or an increase in
the number of either market makers or takers will reduce the duration of liquidity cycles,
and thus increase the trading rate and the profitability of the trading venue.
The endogeneity of the monitoring intensities introduces a cross-sided liquidity ex-
ternality between liquidity provision and consumption. Foucault et al. (2013) suggest
that exogenous shocks or changes to make/take fees, monitoring costs, and the number
of takers/makers can be used as instruments for the identification of cross-sided liquid-
ity externalities. The exogenous and endogenous relations among the variables appear
in Figure 2. This paper focuses on identifying the existence of this cross-sided liquidity
externality.
Figure 2
Endogenous and Exogenous Relation among Variables in Foucault et al.
(2013)
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3 Data
This paper uses the complete set of quotes and trades in the NASDAQ OMX BX system
for the period October 1, 2010 to March 31, 2011. The data is obtained from NASDAQ
ITCH-TotalView system on special order. We retain stocks for which information is avail-
able in Trades and Quotes (TAQ), Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP), and
Compustat. Following the literature, we retain only common stocks (Common Stock Indi-
cator Type=1) and focus only on common shares (Share Code 10 and 11) and stocks that
do not change primary exchange, ticker symbol, or CUSIP over the sample period (Has-
brouck, 2009; Goyenko, Holden, and Trzcinka, 2009; Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam,
2000). We also exclude stocks that exhibit a price lower than $5 or higher than $1000,
and market capitalization less than $1,000,000 at any point in time during the sample
period. Finally, we exclude any day/stock observation with less than 10 trades a day.
Our final sample comprises 1,867 stocks and 101,176 stock/day observations.
To reconstruct the complete limit order book (LOB) for all the stocks in BX for the
whole sample period, we employ the complete dataset of new order messages, updates,
cancelations, deletions and executions. We use the LOB information to calculate daily
stock characteristic variables in BX. Specifically, we construct realized volatility (Volatil-
ity) as the sum of squared five minute returns, number of trades (Trades) as the sum of
trades per stock during the day, number of traded shares (Traded Shares) as the sum of
the number of shares traded across all trades during the day, and trading volume (Vol-
ume) as Traded Shares times price of trade. All the variables constructed from the LOB
are defined in Table A1 in the Appendix.
In BX, there is a rebate for taking liquidity and a fee for filling the LOB for NASDAQ
and NYSE listed stocks (Tape A and C). For all non-NASDAQ and non-NYSE listed
stocks (Tape B), there is a rebate for providing liquidity and a fee for taking liquidity.
Tape B stocks constitute about 2% of our total number of day/stock observations. Table
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A2 in the Appendix shows that Tape B stocks are quite small and not very heavily traded.
Make/take fee changes affect Tape B stocks in the opposite way of Tape A and C stocks.
Because Tape B stocks can confound the results, we exclude them from the sample.
3.1 Constructing the make and take cycles
To carry out our analysis, we need to conceptualize and create a measure of cycles that
is compatible with Foucault et al. (2013) and that matches Figure 1. We calculate take
cycles as the difference in time between the first market order and the first subsequent
limit order that improves the best price after the last trade. We calculate make cycles
as the difference in time between the first limit order that improves the best prevailing
quote after one or a series of market orders and the first market order. Figure 3 provides
an example of the cycle calculation taken from the sample.
For illustration, we only focus on the bid side in Figure 3, the calculation is analogous
for the ask side. Starting from the left, the first triangle (at message number 1 in the
x-axis) represents a limit order that improves the best prevailing bid. This initiates the
make cycle, which lasts until a market order to sell arrives at message number 5, at which
point the make cycle stops. The make cycle is the time difference between message 5 and
message 1, t5 − t1. The time of the first trade is included in the make cycle, because
one needs to capture how quickly market takers are responding to the incentive of lower
spreads, provided by market makers. The take cycle starts at message 5 and continues
until a quote improving limit order arrives at message number 8. The take cycle is the
time difference between message 8 and message 5, t8− t5. Then a new make cycle starts.
Messages 4, 7, 16 and 21 are related to changes in the limit order book that do not affect
the best price, e.g. new quotes/updates/cancellations in other levels of the LOB. For
robustness, we construct alternative measures of make/take cycles and present analysis
based on these measures in Section 6.3.
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For the calculation of make cycles, the use of limit orders that improve the best price
is important, because the make cycle should capture how the LOB is replenished after
one (or more) trade(s) that takes away the best price. This is exemplified in the last take
cycle in Figure 3 where a limit order that matches the current best bid arrives at message
number 25 without stopping the take cycle. The take cycle stops only when the quote
improving limit order arrives at message number 28. Limit orders that add depth to the
existing LOB quotes at either the best price or in other layers do not replenish what was
taken away from the trade.9
3.2 Fee structure in BX
Island ECN introduced the maker/taker pricing model in 1997. Liquidity makers usually
receive a rebate (make rebate) for their services while liquidity takers pay a fee (take
fee). The reason is that good prices take longer to be posted by liquidity makers due
9We also construct cycles that include limit orders at the best price. The results of this analysis
remain qualitatively similar and are available from the authors upon request. [IS THIS OK HERE?
SHOULD WE MENTION IT AT ALL?]
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to the free option problem related to limit orders (Copeland and Galai, 1983). This
pricing model incentivizes liquidity provision, because it rewards liquidity providers, by
giving them rebates, and charges participants who remove liquidity from the exchange.
NYSE, NYSE Euronext’s Arca, BATS, Direct Edge X, NASDAQ OMX, and NASDAQ
PSX are some of the U.S. trading venues that use a maker/taker pricing system. An
inverse maker/taker pricing system (“taker/maker pricing” hereafter) first adopted by
Direct Edge in 2008, also exists. The inverse pricing encourages traders to “take,” or
execute against, prices quoted on the exchange, by offering them rebates. This pricing
system aims at profiting from transaction costs by attracting brokerages/investors that
execute large volumes of trades. The target clients of such a pricing system are agency
automated trading strategies for trading at the volume-weighted average price (VWAP),
not at a single price. The inverted pricing model was also directed towards low-price
stocks with lots of dark pool activity. While three venues-BX, BATS-Y and Direct Edge
A-adopted the taker/maker model, Direct Edge A discontinued it in August 1, 2011.
3.3 Summary statistics
Table 1 provides an overview of the sample characteristics. On average there are 290
trades a day per stock. In BX the trade size of 107 shares is much smaller than the order
size of 196 shares. Following Goldstein and Kavajecz (2000), the cumulative depth is
calculated as the sum of all shares available at a particular price or better on the LOB,
at successively distant prices. The table presents depth at 5 and 10 levels away from the
best quotes. On average there are 3,700 and 6,149 shares in the first five and 10 levels of
the book, respectively. Depth, on the bid and ask side, increases on average by 188 shares
per tick for the first five levels of the book (Slope5) and by 394 shares for the first 10
levels of the book (Slope10). The average daily dollar trading volume is about $2 million
and the average number of traded shares is 38,725.
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We calculate the cycles first by taking the mean and the median daily cycle within
stocks and then generating statistics across stocks. Table 2 shows characteristics of the
cycle durations across stocks measured in seconds. The mean represents the cross-sectional
characteristics of the within-stock mean (WS Mean), while the median represents the
cross-sectional characteristics of the within-stock median (WS Median). The take cycles
are much shorter than the make cycles. It takes on average about 631 seconds for liquidity
to be filled in the market before liquidity is consumed in about 62 seconds. Median cycle
times, i.e., the cross-sectional mean and median of the within-stock median, are much
lower than mean cycle times, implying the existence of periods and stocks with very long
cycle durations. The differences between the mean and the median cycles and between
the make and take cycles are statistically different from zero.
Next, we sort stocks in terciles based on market capitalization and the daily number of
trades. Table 3 presents the statistics for the make and take cycles for stocks grouped by
trade (Panel A) and market capitalization (Panel B) terciles. Tercile 1 refers to small-cap
stocks and Tercile 3 corresponds to large-cap stocks. We present the statistics for both
the mean and the median within stocks. The make cycle continues to be longer than
the take cycle across different size and trade terciles. Within the terciles, the difference
between the mean and the median is smaller than for the entire sample, and the standard
deviations are lower than those in Table 2. We also find a cross-sectional difference in the
make/take cycle between stocks that have different sizes and numbers of trades per day.
Larger and more traded stocks have shorter make and take cycles.
We also provide a graph of the variation in liquidity cycles during the day. Figure 4
shows the average cycle length across the day. The intraday length of the make and take
cycles is highly positively correlated (94%), suggesting the existence of cross-sided liquidity
externality. The make/take cycles are shorter in the morning as information and news are
updated into the market. The cycles become longer as the day progresses but decrease
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towards the end of the day, when investors trade more aggressively to complete their
portfolio rebalancing and market makers balance their positions or close their inventories.
This pattern is the mirror image of the trading volume pattern in Admati and Pfleiderer
(1988), where more participants enter the market in the morning and at the end of the
trading day.10
Table 4 presents univariate daily correlations between the make and take cycles (means
and medians) and number of trades, trade size, spreads, volume, and market capitaliza-
tion. The correlation between daily make and take cycles is large and positive, matching
the intraday-correlation evidence in Figure 4. There is a positive correlation among make
and take cycles, and spreads: quoted and relative spreads. The make and take cycles
are negatively correlated to the number of trades and traded shares. In Foucault et al.’s
(2013) theoretical model, the relation is a mechanical one, showing why a trading platform
would like to shorten make/take cycles. Shorter cycles imply a larger number of trades
and traded shares, which will increase the trading venue’s profit.
3.4 Panel regression
We specify regressions for the daily panel as follows:
D
(maker)
it = α
maker
i + γ
maker
t + β
makerD
(taker)
it + δ
maker ′Xit + 
maker
it (1)
and,
D
(taker)
it = α
taker
i + γ
taker
t + β
takerD
(maker)
it + δ
taker ′Xit + 
taker
it , (2)
10The positive correlation between make and take cycles is not due to the make/take fee structure in
BX. We observe a similar pattern when constructing the cycles for NASDAQ for the same time period.
Due to capacity limitations we construct the make/take cycles for only 188 stocks in NASDAQ, see
Skjeltorp, Sojli, and Tham (2012) for more details on the stock selection procedure. Figure A1 in the
Appendix shows a similar pattern to the BX intraday cycles and the correlation between make and take
cycles is 0.94. The NASDAQ cycles are shorter because there is much more quoting and trading activity
at the NASDAQ.
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where D
(maker)
it and D
(taker)
it are the within-stock mean make and take cycle durations (in
seconds) respectively for stock i in day t and Xit is a vector of control variables. The
control variables are chosen using the correlations in Table 4. We include trade size,
number of trades, traded shares, volatility, and quoted spread. αi are firm fixed effects
and γt are day of the week dummies. The firm fixed effects capture the impact of the level
of make/take fees and number of market makers and takers on the level of the cycles.
One could alternatively use a non-linear specification such as survival analysis for panel
data. However, we choose to use OLS over a non-linear specification throughout all of
our analysis for two reasons. Although a correctly specified non-linear model may fit the
conditional expectation function more closely than a linear model, a mispecified non-linear
model often performs worse. OLS provides a robust approach as the best linear estimator
for the non-linear relation. Moreover, Angrist (2005) argues for the use of linear model and
OLS over nonlinear models for causal inference, because treatment effects generated by
correctly specified nonlinear models are likely to be indistinguishable from OLS regression
coefficients. Secondly, the literature on instrumental variables for nonlinear models and
the statistical properties of nonlinear estimators are poorly developed and are not well
understood.
Table 5 provides the result for the fixed effects panel regression with clustered standard
errors at the stock level. We use the trade size, number of trades, traded shares, volatility,
and quoted spread as control variables. The estimated coefficients of the take and the
make cycle are positive and statistically significant, indicating that an increase in the take
cycle is associated with an increase in the make cycle and vice versa. The impact of take
cycles on make cycles appears to be stronger than the opposite effect. An increase by
one standard deviation in the make cycle increases the take cycle by 55 seconds, while
an increase in the take cycle by one standard deviation increases the make cycle by 114
seconds. From the control variables, number of trades, shares traded, and quoted spread
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have a strong and significant impact on both make and take cycles.
The panel regression allows us to establish a positive time-series association between
make and take cycles. As both are endogenous variables, the results are insufficient to
make any statement about the existence of cross-sided liquidity externality. To estab-
lish causality and to identify the liquidity externality, we need to rely on instrumental
variables.
4 Identification
4.1 Identification using changes in make/take fees
The Foucault et al. (2013) model implies that changes in either the make or take fees in
only one trading venue will allow us to identify the cross-side liquidity externality. For
example, in the case of the reverse fee structure in BX, an increase in take rebate should
increase the takers’ monitoring intensity (take cycle) because it serves as a monetary
incentive for liquidity consumption but not for liquidity provision. However, the increase
in the speed of liquidity consumption will increase the speed of liquidity provision, because
it exerts a positive externality on market makers. Higher liquidity consumption increases
the rate at which liquidity makers find trading opportunities that will make liquidity
providers better off. Our first identification channel for the cross-side externality is to use
changes in either make or take fees/rebates in BX.
We exploit one change of the maker/taker pricing in BX on November 1, 2010, to
identify the impact of make/take fees on the liquidity cycle. On November 1, 2010, BX
increased the take rebate by 100%, from one cent to two cents per 100 shares. As this
event significantly decreases the trading cost of takers, it should increase their monitoring
and result in shorter take cycles in BX.
18
4.2 Identification using technological shock to liquidity takers
As monitoring the market can be costly, Foucault et al. (2013) argue that liquidity cycles
depend on the monitoring decisions of liquidity makers and takers. Liquidity makers and
takers decide on their optimal monitoring activity by considering the trade-off between
being the first to identify a profitable opportunity and the cost of monitoring. Thus a
shock to the monitoring cost of takers (makers) affects the monitoring intensity of makers
(takers) because of the cross-side externality. Our second identification strategy of the
cross-side liquidity externality uses a technological change in BX, which decreases the
monitoring cost of takers. As the technological shock affects only the monitoring cost of
takers, it provides an ideal instrument for identifying how the change in taker’s monitoring
intensity (take cycle) will affect the monitoring of liquidity makers (make cycle).
More specifically, we use the introduction of the CART order routing strategy offered
from March 7, 2011. CART aims to minimize trading costs for liquidity demanders
and automatically routes marketable orders to different venues in a specific sequence to
obtain execution. Orders entered using CART are first routed to BX (receiving a rebate
if executed) and, if unexecuted, routed to PSX (paying a fee if executed). Then, if the
order remains unexecuted, the algorithm checks the NASDAQ book, where the orders pay
a fee if executed. Finally, if the order remains unexecuted in all three OMX venues and
is not an immediate-or-cancel order, it will be posted on the NASDAQ limit order book
as a regular limit order (receiving a regular rebate offered to make orders if executed).
The CART facility clearly reduces the monitoring cost for market takers, because
the CART routing system does the monitoring for the taker, while the CART strategy
offers no benefit to a market maker.11 To identify the make side liquidity externality,
the analysis treats the introduction of this routing technology as an exogenous event that
11At the same time as the CART facility was introduced, NASDAQ also introduced the QSAV strategy
which behaves similarly to CART, but routes to other destinations after checking the NASDAQ book.
Pricing for QSAV is the same as CART.
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affects the take side monitoring cost in BX. We expect the durations of the make/take
cycles in BX to decrease substantially after the introduction of CART.
4.3 Validity of instruments
As liquidity take and make cycles are endogenous variables, the slope coefficients from
estimating Equations (1) and (2) via OLS are biased estimates of the causal effect of a
change in the take cycle on the make cycle (and vice versa). To address this problem, the
instrumental variable should affect take cycles but be uncorrelated with the error term
makerit , the exogeneity assumption. In addition, it is important that the instrument does
not suffer from the weak instrument problem highlighted by Bound, Jaeger, and Baker
(1995).
We believe that the validity of both our instruments is well supported and motivated
by the theoretical and structural model of Foucault et al. (2013), as described in Section
2. The theoretical grounding of our instruments addresses the common criticism of many
instrumental variable studies, in which there is no underlying theoretical relation among
the variables (see Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 2000).
The exogeneity assumption of our instruments is strengthened by BX stating in its
SEC filing that the reason for the BX fee change is a direct and immediate response to
fee changes in October 2010 by competitors (e.g., DirectEdge and BATS Y-Exchange)
and not due to observed changes in cycles within the exchange.12 This decision-making
process is consistent with Foucault et al. (2013), where the trading platform chooses its
make/take fee in the first stage of the game, and liquidity makers and takers choose their
monitoring intensities according to those make/take fees. Moreover, the validity of the
instrument is further supported by the U.S. equity market’s being a competitive market
12See www.sec.gov/rules/sro/bx/2010/34-63285.pdf, www.sec.gov/rules/sro/edga/2010/
34-63053.pdf, www.sec.gov/rules/sro/byx/2010/34-63154.pdf, and www.sec.gov/rules/sro/
byx/2010/34-63149.pdf.
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with a large number of market makers and takers, where makers and takers are likely to
be price takers to the make/take fees provided by various trading venues.
For the second instrument, BX states that the purpose of introducing CART, which
reduces the taker’s monitoring cost, is to give market participants an additional volun-
tary routing option that will enable them to easily access liquidity available on all of
the national securities exchanges operated by the NASDAQ OMX Group. The routing
strategy benefits participants who neither use high-frequency trading strategies nor have
rapid access to liquidity that is provided in many venues.13 Moreover, as announcements
of these changes occur many weeks before they are implemented, it is highly unlikely
that the introduction of changes is correlated with idiosyncratic make cycles weeks into
the future. Given the reasons stated by BX in the SEC filings, we argue that both our
instruments are exogenous to the make and take cycles.
Lastly, the exclusion restriction assumption requires the instruments to affect the
make cycle only via the take cycle. We have argued that our instruments are relevant
only for the take cycle and that they are unlikely to affect the make cycle via non-taker
cycle related reasons. One potential alternative avenue through which our instruments
can affect the make cycle is other liquidity variables, such as the bid-ask spread. This
channel is possible if liquidity makers widen the bid-ask spread by not posting limit orders
at the best bid-ask prices, in anticipation of the reduction in taker’s fee and monitoring
cost. We argue that this is strategy suboptimal for market makers, because the expected
payoff of being the first to post a limit order at the best bid-ask price is higher than
waiting at other bid-ask prices with wider spread. When one considers the possibility
of off-the-equilibrium play or the trembling hand equilibrium, an equilibrium where the
bid-ask spread is widened as a response to increased benefits to takers, the wider spread
is likely to be unstable. Even if one ignores the previous argument and considers the
13See www.sec.gov/rules/sro/nasdaq/2011/34-63900.pdf.
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bid-ask spread channel, the impact of the bid-ask spread on the make cycle will only bias
against finding any or finding a negative cross-sided liquidity externality.
An alternative channel could be the response of competing trading venues to the
fee change in BX, a response implying that competing venues will adopt strategies to
drive orderflow away from and not into BX. Another avenue could be makers choosing to
switch to being takers because of the increase in rebates and improvement in technology.
In such a case, we expect the number of makers relative to takers to decrease, for a fixed
total number of makers and takers. Thus the make cycle would increase while the take
cycle decreases. The competing trading venues and endogenous choice of becoming maker
and taker channels imply a negative, not a positive, cross-sided externality. Taking into
consideration these channels suggests that we underestimate the magnitude of the positive
cross-sided externality. However, we admit that we cannot test these conjectures and that
our conclusions on causality rely on the intuitively attractive and logical argument just
presented - but that the exclusion restriction assumption is ultimately untestable. We
discuss the potential issue of weak instruments in the next section.
5 Results
5.1 Regressions
Given that we want to identify the cross-sided liquidity externality in an endogenous
system of liquidity makers’ and takers’ monitoring intensities, we use changes in the take
fee and the exogenous technological shock as instruments in a two-stage least squares
procedure. To address the endogenity problem, we use the instrumental variables (IV)
methodology in which the endogenous variables are the make and the take cycles.14
14We also conduct an event study around the introduction of the two instruments. We find that the
introduction of both instruments significantly reduces both make and take cycles across trade and market
capitalization terciles. This type of analysis is only indicative of the validity of the instruments, because
of omitted variable bias, and therefore we focus on the regression analysis. We provide these results in a
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To control for other important conditioning variables such as number of trades, volatil-
ity, and spread, we run a two-stage least squares regression of the within-stock mean make
cycle, using the two shocks as instruments. Fee Shock is a dummy variable equal to 1 for
the period November 01, 2010 - December 31, 2010, and zero otherwise, and Technology
Shock is a dummy variable equal to 1 for the period March 07, 2011 - March 31, 2011,
and zero otherwise. We include trade size, number of trades, number of traded shares,
volatility, and quoted spread as control variables. In addition, we include firm and time
fixed effects and cluster standard errors by firm. Columns (1)-(4) in Table 6 show the
results for the just identified IV regression analysis, one instrument per IV regression.
The first-stage results show that the two shocks lead to a significant decrease in take cy-
cles. The Angrist-Pischke F -test statistic (Angrist and Pischke, 2009) for the hypothesis
that instruments do not enter the first stage regression is greater than 10 with a p-value
(0.00) for all regressions. The null hypothesis of under-identification is also rejected with
a p-value of 0.00, using the Kleibergen-Paap LM test. Thus we are unlikely to be affected
by an under-identification or a weak instrument problem. The second-stage regression
results show strong and statistically significant positive externalities between liquidity
cycles. Spread appears to be statistically significant for both the make and take cycles,
and larger spreads lead to longer cycles.15
In addition to using each instrument separately, we use both shocks as instruments in
the IV regression. The use of two instruments leads to overidentification. Columns (5) and
(6) in Table 6 show the results for the overidentified IV regression analysis. The first-stage
results show that the two shocks lead to a significant decrease in take cycles. Moreover,
the second-stage regression results confirm the previously found results of strong and
statistically significant externalities between make and take liquidity cycles. As expected,
previous version of the paper available at: http://www.norges-bank.no/pages/92226/Norges_Bank_
Working_Paper_2012_20.pdf.
15The results are robust to using other measures of liquidity, e.g., relative spread. To conserve space,
the results are not presented but are available from the authors upon request.
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the test statistics for under- and weak-identification are even stronger than for the single
instrument regressions.
5.2 Internal vs. external validity
The market share of BX is about 5% during the sample period. One potential concern is
whether the average treatment effect that we estimate is representative of the population,
i.e. across the entire U.S. market. In other words, one might have concerns over the
estimated average treatment effect, which is a local average treatment effect (LATEs)
estimated across a subsample of the population. Ideally, while we would like to have
natural experiments and valid instruments to estimate the average treatment effect of the
population, such a set-up is both difficult and rare in all social science studies. Motivated
by and consistent with the econometric and labor economics literature, we argue that
having good and credible estimates of the average treatment of a subpopulation is more
important than having poor and biased estimates without valid instruments, with little
credibility for the entire population. According to the causal inference literature, there
is a trade-off between internal validity and external validity. In the spirit of Imbens and
Wooldridge (2009) and Imbens (2010), we focus on the importance of having internal
validity and claim that it is “better to have LATEs than nothing.”
5.3 Specialization in market making
In practice, liquidity providers use both limit and market orders, which deviates from
the assumption that firms specialize either in market making or taking by Foucault et al.
(2013). However, the assumption is not unreasonable because many large market partic-
ipants like Global Electronic Trading Company (GETCO), Optiver, and Knights Capital
Group specialize in market making. Examples of specialized market makers can been
seen from Optiver’s and Getco’s claims that they continuously quote both bid and ask
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prices for financial instruments and try to maintain a neutral position at all times. Their
business model is facilitated by the entry of buyers and sellers into the markets at dif-
ferent times and allows buyers and sellers to immediately transfer their risk, ensuring
liquidity in the market and execution certainty for investors.16 These high frequency and
algorithm-based market making firms constitute a very large volume of trades in the U.S,
with Getco and Knights together accounting for about 37% of daily trading volume.
In addition, these high-frequency market-makers execute most of their trades with
limit orders. Menkveld (2011) finds that about 78% of high-frequency market makers’
trades are executed with limit orders. Using a detailed dataset where one can identify
HFT trades, their trading strategies, and the category of HFT firms, Hagstro¨mer and
Norde´n (2012) show that HFT market makers constitute about 70% of the trading volume
and 81-86% of limit order traffic.
Even if makers choose to switch and become takers because of changes in rebates and in
technology, the number of makers relative to takers will decrease (for a fixed total number
of makers and takers) and the make cycle will increase while the take cycle decreases.
This is opposite to what we find in the empirical analysis. Given these arguments, the
explanation that liquidity provision begets liquidity consumption on average is a more
convincing explanation for our results.
5.4 Negative liquidity externality
Although we find that on average there is a positive liquidity externality, we also know
that liquidity providers face the risk of being adversely picked off. Thus, it is interesting
and important to understand the local negative externality effect. If negative liquidity
externalities exist because of pick-off risk, then the liquidity externality effect should be
smaller or even negative among stocks with higher adverse selection.
16See http://www.optiver.com/amsterdam/the-company/core-business and http://www.
getcollc.com/what-we-do/market-making.
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Hasbrouck (1991) finds that trades are more informative for smaller firms relative to
larger firms. He concludes that market capitalization and adverse selection are negatively
related. Copeland and Galai (1983) argue that bid-ask spreads are informative about
adverse selection and bid-ask spread increases with increasing pick-off risk by informed
traders. Glosten and Harris (1988) suggest that asset return volatility is positively cor-
related to adverse selection costs. To determine if negative externality is also at work,
we first sort stocks into three groups based on market capitalization, relative spread, and
return volatility as proxies for pick-off risk. We re-estimate the two-stage least square
regression for these sub-groups, using both shocks as instruments.
Results in Table 7 provide support for the existence of a negative externality. Across
all pick-off risk proxies, the cross-sided liquidity externality is the smallest among stocks
with the highest pick-off risk. The magnitude of the cross-sided externality for stocks
with largest relative spread and volatility, and smallest market capitalization is smaller
compared to stocks with less pick-off risk. Although we find that the average treatment
effect of cross-sided externality is positive, Table 7 suggests that the negative effect of
cross-sided externality is higher among stocks with more adverse selection and pick-off
risk.
6 Robustness
6.1 Median effect
Table 2 shows that the average daily distribution of cycles is skewed. To ensure that
the results we obtain are not driven by outliers, we re-estimate the instrumental variable
regression on the within-stock median cycles. The results in Table 8 show the existence
of positive and statistically significant cross-sided liquidity externalities for the median
cycles. The impact of take cycles on make cycles is even larger when we use the within-
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stock median cycles instead of the within-stock mean cycles.
6.2 Split sample IV
Two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimates are biased toward the probability limit of OLS
in finite samples with normal disturbances. This problem is exacerbated in samples with
non-normal disturbances. All things being equal, the bias of 2SLS is greater if the excluded
instruments explain a smaller share of the variation in the endogenous variable. Angrist
and Krueger (1995) propose a split-sample instrumental variables (SSIV) estimator that
is not biased towards OLS. In SSIV, the sample is randomly split in two halves. The
first half of the sample is used for estimating the first-stage regression parameters and
for obtaining the fitted values of the instrumented variable. The instrumented variable is
then used in the second stage of the regression estimated in the second part of the sample.
SSIV is a special case of the two-sample instrumental variables estimator in Angrist and
Krueger (1992). In addition, to account for the SSIV bias towards 0, Angrist and Krueger
(1995) introduce the unbiased SSIV.
Table 9 presents the results for the split sample IV regression. The first stage regression
results, estimated on half the sample, are very close to the first stage results presented in
the full sample estimates in Table 6. The second stage coefficients of the instrumented
variable, take cycle, are positive and larger than those in the 2SLS estimation in Table 6
and are highly statistically significant.
6.3 Alternative measures of cycles
We construct two alternative measures of the make/take cycles. The first measure cal-
culates the make cycle as the time between the first quote that improves the limit order
book after a trade and the last quote that improves the limit order book before a trade,
Make1. The take cycle is calculated as the time difference between the first trade and the
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last trade in a cluster, Take1. Panel A of Figure A2 in the Appendix presents an example
of the cycle calculation. The make cycle starts with message 1 (in the x-axis), the first
quote improving limit order, and ends with message 3, the last limit order before a trade
in message 5 (message 4 is not related to the best bid, but to quotes in other levels of
the book). Thus, the make cycle duration is t3 − t1. The take cycle starts with message
5, the first trade, and ends with message 6, the last trade before a quote improvement.
Thus, the take cycle duration is t6 − t5. This alternative measure addresses the concern
that the make cycle depends on the actions of the taker and the take cycle depends on
the action of the makers in our main make/take cycle measure.17
Another way to measure cycles is to treat them as the reaction time of makers and
takers to each-other’s actions. Therefore, we construct a second measure that calculates
the reaction time of makers and takers. MakeR is the difference in time between the
last trade and the first quote, TakeR is the difference between the last quote and the first
trade. Panel B of Figure A2 in the Appendix presents an example of the cycle calculation.
The TakeR cycle starts with message 3, the last limit order before a trade, and ends with
the trade in message 5. Thus, the TakeR cycle duration is t5−t4. The MakeR cycle starts
with message 6, the last trade, and ends with message 8, the first quote improving limit
order. Thus, the take cycle duration is t8 − t6.
Panel A of Table A3 in the Appendix shows the summary statistics for these alternative
cycles. The cycles are shorter using these measures. Panel B of Table A3 provides the
results for fixed effects panel regressions with clustered standard errors at the stock level.
We use the trade size, number of trades, traded shares, volatility, and quoted spread as
control variables. The estimated coefficients of the take and the make cycle are positive
and statistically significant, indicating that an increase in the take cycle is associated with
17In cases where there might be only one trade in between quote improving limit orders, the take cycle
will be zero. Thus we create the take cycle considering only cases where there are more than one trade
in a take cycle. The results remain quantitatively similar as for Take1 and are available upon request.
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an increase in the make cycle and vice versa, as in Section 3.4.
Table A4 in the Appendix presents the results of the IV regression using the new cycles.
The effects of the take cycle shocks on the make cycle remain large and significant. The
events also affect the reaction time of the market participants substantially.
6.4 Market fragmentation and RegNMS
The dominance of traditional trading venues such as NYSE has decreased since Regulation
NMS in 2005.18 Today, trading volume is shared roughly equally among NYSE, NASDAQ,
BATS, DirectEdge and “dark pools”. Figure A3, taken from Angel, Harris, and Spatt
(2011), presents the evolution of the market share of different trading venues from 2003
to 2011 for NYSE-listed stocks. The competitive landscape and the role of RegNMS
in the sample period are potentially important for the analysis, because orderflows and
trading activities in other markets might have an impact on BX. Thus, competition and
fragmentation may affect the make/take cycles in BX. However, it is challenging to study
the demand and supply of liquidity and make/take cycles across markets because of lack
of detailed data from all the U.S. trading venues. To address concerns about the role of
market fragmentation on our results, we create a cycle measure for the aggregate market,
using TAQ data, and investigate two events that affect the whole market in periods when
the market is less fragmented (pre-RegNMS).
We create cycles in TAQ by using the number of quote updates, the number of trades
and the number of seconds the market is trading (9:30-16:00 EST, 23,400 seconds). The
average take cycle is equal to the total trading time divided by the number of trades,
23,400 seconds divided by the number of trades. The average make cycle is equal to the
total trading time divided by the number of quote updates, 23,400 seconds divided by
18Regulation NMS approved by the SEC is a series of initiatives to promote fair and efficient price
formation across U.S. financial markets, through competition among market participants.
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the number of quote updates.19 The correlation between the TAQ and BX cycles for the
period October 1, 2010 and March 31, 2011 is 0.20.
We study two events when the market is dominated by NYSE and is less fragmented,
the first one is the introduction of Autoquote by NYSE in the first half of 2003, and the
second is the reduction in tick size in January 2001. Autoquote was introduced as a means
to reduce the work load of clerks and automatically update the inside quote at the NYSE.
Autoquote allowed algorithmic liquidity suppliers to, say quickly notice an abnormally
wide inside quote and provide liquidity accordingly via a limit order. This measure
affects the monitoring cost of market makers because it reduces their burden of having
to manually update quotes. Autoquote was introduced in phases, the first batch of six
large-cap stocks started using Autoquote on January 29, 2003. Then 200 more stocks were
added until May 27, 2003. The last batch was introduced on May 27, 2003. Hendershott,
Jones, and Menkveld (2011) provide detailed documentation about the introduction of
Autoquote and the validity of instrumental variables based on Autoquote. The natural
experiment setup based on Hendershott et al. (2011) provides a clean platform to study
the cross-sided liquidity externality in a less fragmented market environment.
In addition, we study an event where the marginal cost of monitoring is more signif-
icant. On January 29, 2001, NYSE reduced the minimum tick size from $1/16 to $0.01.
This shock affects market makers, by reducing their profit margin, i.e. it’s a reduction in
compensation for market making. This naturally decreases the incentive, the fraction of
gains from trade, for market makers to monitor and thus increases the make cycle. On
the other hand, the reduction in minimum tick size increases the takers’ fraction of gains
from trade, thus there is more incentive for takers to monitor markets with a small tick
19This measure is a good approximation to the make/take cycles for the period pre RegNMS, because
liquidity supply and demand were mainly taking place in NYSE. This measure is not very appropriate
for the post-2005 period for three reasons. First, it is not clear if a trade in Exchange A should be in
the same take cycle as a trade in Exchange B. Second, quotes of odd-lot shares are not reported in TAQ.
Third, data from TAQ is not ordered sequentially according to the time in which actions happened in
the whole market, but is ordered by exchange.
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size. This suggests a decrease in the take cycle due to the shock. The opposite effect
of the minimum tick-size change on takers and makers’ incentive to monitor allows us
to conduct a robustness test on the existence of cross-sided externality. If the negative
shock to makers causes a negative shock to takers or the positive shock to takers causes a
positive shock to makers, the externality will be positive. Otherwise, the externality will
be negative.
Panel A of Table A5 in the Appendix shows the IV regression using Autoquote as an
instrument. The estimation period is November 1, 2002 - July 31, 2003. Autoquote is a
dummy variable equal to 1 for the period after Autoquote was introduced by NYSE, and
zero otherwise. This period varies by stock from January 29, 2003 - May 27, 2003.20 We
use control variables similar to Hendershott et al. (2011). We include spread, volume,
volatility, reverse of price, and market capitalization, constructed from CRSP. The intro-
duction of Autoquote has a very strong effect in reducing make cycles by 60 seconds. The
effect of the make cycles on the take cycles is large and positive.
Panel B of Table A5 in the Appendix shows the IV regression using the Tick size as
instrument. The estimation period for Panel B is December 1, 2000 - March 31, 2001.
Tick Shock is a dummy variable equal to 1 for the period after January 29, 2001, and
zero otherwise. We use the same control variables as in Panel A. The reduction in tick
size increases the average make cycle by 156 seconds, and as a result the take cycles
also increases significantly. Thus, there is support for the existence of positive cross-
sided externalities, since we observe an increase in the make cycle after the reduction in
minimum tick size (positive coefficient in the first stage regression) and a positive and
statistically significant coefficient in our second stage IV regression. Both these events
on the make cycle, using market wide measure and a period where the market was not
fragmented, corroborate the previous evidence obtained from events in BX.
20The dates on the introduction of Autoquote to various stocks are available from Terry Hendershott’s
web page http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/hender/.
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7 Economic Significance
With the estimated cross-sided liquidity externality, we can evaluate the effectiveness of
BX’s pricing strategy of changing their take rebate from one cent to two cent per 100
shares on November 1, 2010. The make fee remains unchanged at three cents per 100
shares. After the price change, the make/take spread is one cent per 100 shares traded. To
compute the profitability of the trading platform’s change in pricing strategy, we consider
the expected profit of BX per unit time Πe, see equation 12 in Foucault et al. (2013):
Πe ≡ c¯.R(µ¯, τ¯) = (cm + ct). 1
Dmaker +Dtaker
, (3)
where R(µ¯, τ¯) is the trading rate or average number of transaction per unit time, Dmaker
is the average duration of the make cycle, Dtaker is the average duration of the take
cycle, cm is the make fee, ct is the take fee, and c¯ is the make/take spread charged by
the platform. Equation 3 states that the profit of the trading platform depends on the
make/take spread, c¯, and the trading rate, R(µ¯, τ¯).
By taking the total derivative of Πe with respect to ct, we can approximate the change
in revenue of the exchange for a fee change with the following first order approximation:
∆Πe =
δΠ
δct
× ∆ct, (4)
where,
δΠ
δct
=
δΠ
δc¯
dc¯
dct
+
δΠ
δDmaker
dDmaker
dct
+
δΠ
δDtaker
dDtaker
dct
=
1
Dmaker +Dtaker
− (
1
Dmaker +Dtaker
)2 × dDmaker
dct
× c¯ − ( 1
Dmaker +Dtaker
)2 × dDtaker
dct
× c¯
=
1
Dmaker +Dtaker
− ((
1
Dmaker +Dtaker
)2 × dDmaker
dDtaker
dDtaker
dct
− (
1
Dmaker +Dtaker
)2 × dDtaker
dct
)× c¯
Using the information on the length of cycles, ct= 0.02 cnt/share, cm=0.03 cnt/share,
Dmaker=208 seconds, Dtaker=31 seconds, the IV estimates of
dDtaker
dct
=772 sec/(cnt/share)
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from the first stage regression, and cross-sided externality dDmaker
dDtaker
=1.63 from Table 6:
δΠ
δct
= 0.0061.
If there are on average 1,867 stocks trading 7.5 hours per day over 250 days, we
find that BX suffers a loss of approximately $768,737 after implementing the fee change.
However, this finding does not suggest that BX is losing money in their business but
reflects the drop in revenue after the fee change. The reason for the drop in revenue is
the over-subsidization of takers with a two cent rebate. Even though the trading rate
increased due to the positive cross-sided liquidity externality, the loss in revenue from
the subsidization exceeds the increase in revenue from the increase of trading rate. We
calculate the economic cost of ignoring the cross-sided externality. By setting dDmaker
dDtaker
=0,
BX incurs a loss of $969,252. Thus we estimate the economic cost of ignoring the cross-
sided externality to be -$969,252+$768,737 =-$200,515 for 1,867 stocks across a year, a
significant loss for a small exchange such as BX. This example highlights the importance
of estimating the liquidity externality and choosing the appropriate subsidization for one
side of the market.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we empirically investigate the economics of two-sided markets and test
the theoretical prediction of the existence of a positive liquidity externality in Foucault
et al. (2013). Using detailed data from Nasdaq OMX BX, we estimate the magnitude of
cross-sided externality between liquidity providers and demanders. We also evaluate the
economic significance of this externality and assess the effectiveness of a make/take fee
change by BX using the estimated externality.
Extrapolating from Foucault et al. (2013), for identification we use exogenous changes
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in the make/take fee structure and technological shocks for liquidity takers as instruments
to cleanly identify a new type of liquidity externality and cross-side complementarities
of liquidity makers and takers in U.S. equity markets. We find a positive and strong
cross-sided liquidity externalities between liquidity providers and takers. Shocks to fees
of either makers or takers cause changes in the length of the liquidity cycles of both makers
and takers. A change in technology that improves market takers ability to monitor the
market reduces both the maker and taker liquidity cycles.
Through the economic evaluation on the effectiveness of a make/take fee change by BX,
we find the magnitude of the externality and its economic significance to be substantially
large. By studying the estimated revenue of the fee change, we estimate that BX suffers
a loss in revenue of $770,000. Even though the trading rate in BX has increased after the
fee change, due to the positive cross-sided liquidity externality, the loss in revenue comes
from the over-subsidization of one side of the market. Our study shows that consideration
of two-sided markets and identification of network externality have important pricing
implications for the trading platform, as they determine how the platform should set
prices for both sides of the market.
Our paper lays the basic framework and strategies for examining network and partici-
pation externality of two-sided markets in the finance literature. An important extension
of our work is the identification not only of cross-sided externality but also of cross-
platform externality in a two-sided market framework with competitive intermediaries.
While our focus is on two-sided market and network externalities, our work also has
implications on the study of liquidity resiliency, the debate over make/take pricing in
the U.S. equity market, and the new dynamic relation between liquidity demanders and
suppliers with the changing structure of financial markets.
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Table 2
Make Take Cycles
Table shows the daily cycle durations in seconds. Make and Take cycles are calculated using only limit
orders that improve the best price, as described in Figure 3. The cycles are calculated by taking the
mean and the median daily cycle within stocks. WS Mean represents the cross-sectional characteristics
of the within-stock mean, WS Median represents the cross-sectional characteristics of the within-stock
median. Obs refers to the total number of firm/date observations.
WS Mean WS Median
Make Take Make Take
Mean 631 62 265 27
Median 391 24 100 7
25th 121 12 30 3
75th 957 49 327 16
St. Dev. 687 306 458 271
Obs 101,176 101,176 101,176 101,176
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Table 3
Make Take Cycles - Terciles
Table shows the daily cycle durations in seconds across three trade and market capitalization terciles
for liquidity cycles. Make and Take cycles are calculated using limit orders improving the best price, as
described in Figure 3. The cycles are calculated by taking the mean and the median daily cycle within
stocks. Panel 1 shows the average cycle durations across three trade terciles. Terciles are calculated using
the average number of trades per stock over the sample period. Panel 2 shows the average cycle durations
across three market capitalization terciles. Terciles are calculated using the average size (market capi-
talization) per stock over the sample period. WS Mean represents the cross-sectional characteristics of
the within-stock mean, WS Median represents the cross-sectional characteristics of the within-stock me-
dian. Tercile 1 contains the least traded/lowest size stocks, and tercile 3 contains the most traded/largest
market capitalization stocks.
Tercile 1 Tercile 2 Tercile 3
Make Take Make Take Make Take
Panel 1. Number of Trades
A. WS Mean
Mean 1335 100 440 56 94 29
Median 1226 43 378 24 70 12
25th 885 25 254 14 36 6
75th 1661 81 549 42 120 23
St. Dev. 695 423 294 291 95 108
B. WS Median
Mean 598 48 157 23 31 9
Median 452 14 111 7 22 3
25th 236 7 60 3 12 2
75th 786 28 201 13 40 7
St. Dev. 636 393 187 245 33 51
Panel 2. Market Cap
A. WS Mean
Mean 1016 124 604 42 260 18
Median 889 46 415 25 123 13
25th 408 25 162 14 41 7
75th 1468 92 885 44 337 22
St. Dev. 820 512 570 80 348 22
B. WS Median
Mean 448 60 244 14 99 5
Median 261 14 109 7 31 3
25th 87 6 39 3 13 2
75th 605 31 307 15 101 6
St. Dev. 637 462 344 33 186 8
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Table 5
Preliminary Panel Regressions
Table shows panel regressions of within-stock mean make and take cycles on each other and control
variables. D
(maker)
it = α
maker
i + γ
maker
t + β
makerD
(taker)
it + δ
makerXit + 
maker
it and D
(taker)
it =
αtakeri +γ
taker
t +β
takerD
(maker)
it +δ
takerXit+
taker
it . Make and Take cycles are calculated using limit
orders improving the best price, as described in Figure 3. The cycles are calculated by taking the mean
daily cycle within stocks. Trade Size is the average number of shares per trade, Trades is the number
of trades per day, Traded Shares is the number of shares traded a day, per 1000 shares, Volatility is the
daily realized volatility, and Spread is the quoted spread. All regressions include firm fixed effects and
day of the week dummies. Standard errors are clustered at firm level.
Take Make
Coef. t-stat p-value Coef. t-stat p-value
Make 0.08 7.78 0.00
Take 0.37 3.91 0.00
Trade Size 0.09 0.48 0.63 0.21 0.91 0.37
Trades 0.01 2.71 0.01 -0.19 -5.72 0.00
Traded Shares -0.04 -1.88 0.06 0.51 4.53 0.00
Volatility -28.77 -1.64 0.10 -125.41 -1.01 0.31
Spread 12.23 1.70 0.09 304.69 7.47 0.00
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Table 8
Instrumental Variable Regression - Median
Table shows the 2nd stage of the instrumental variable regression for the within-stock median take cycle
shocks on the make cycle. The 2nd stage presents the results for the second-stage regression, where
the Make Cycle is regressed on the Fitted Take Cycle and control variables. Make and Take cycles are
calculated using limit orders improving the best price, as described in Figure 3. The cycles are calculated
by taking the median daily cycle within stocks. Fee Shock is a dummy variable equal to 1 for the period
November 1, 2010 - December 31, 2010, and zero otherwise, and Technology Shock is a dummy variable
equal to 1 for the period March 7, 2011 - March 31, 2011, and zero otherwise. Trade Size is the average
number of shares per trade, Trades is the number of trades per day, Traded Shares is the number of
shares traded a day, per 1000 shares, Volatility is the daily realized volatility, and Spread is the quoted
spread. AP Test presents the Angrist-Pischke F-statist for weak identification and the associated p-value,
Under-Identification presents the LM statistic for the Kleibergen-Paap under-identification test and the
associated p-value. All regressions include firm fixed effects and day of the week dummies. p-values are
calculated using firm clustered standard errors.
Fee Shock Technology Shock Combined Events
Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value
Take 7.48 0.00 3.77 0.02 6.67 0.00
Trade Size -0.02 0.99 -0.02 0.96 -0.02 0.98
Trades -0.06 0.00 -0.07 0.00 -0.06 0.00
Traded Shares 0.20 0.06 0.20 0.00 0.20 0.04
Volatility 89.28 0.14 32.90 0.59 77.22 0.17
Spread 38.22 0.32 79.47 0.00 47.04 0.15
AP Test 13.20 0.00 9.33 0.00 12.00 0.00
Under-identification 13.09 0.00 9.35 0.00 23.79 0.00
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Table 9
Split Sample Instrumental Variable
Table shows the split sample instrumental variable regression, Angrist and Krueger (1995), for within-
stock mean take cycle shocks on the make cycle. 1st Stage presents the result for the first-stage regression
of Take Cycle on the instrument (the shock dummy variable) and control variables for half the sample,
randomly selected. 2nd Stage presents the results for the second-stage regression, where the Make Cycle
is regressed on the Fitted Take Cycle in the 1st Stage and control variables for the other half of the
sample, randomly selected, see Section 5.1 for more details on the methodology. Make and Take cycles
are calculated using limit orders improving the best price, as described in Figure 3. The cycles are
calculated by taking the mean daily cycle within stocks. Fee Shock is a dummy variable equal to 1 for
the period November 1, 2010 - December 31, 2010, and zero otherwise, and Technology Shock is a dummy
variable equal to 1 for the period March 7, 2011 - March 31, 2011, and zero otherwise. Trade Size is the
average number of shares per trade, Trades is the number of trades per day, Traded Shares is the number
of shares traded a day, per 1000 shares, Volatility is the daily realized volatility, and Spread is the quoted
spread. All regressions include firm fixed effects and day of the week dummies. Panel A presents the
first stage regression results. Panels B and C present the second stage regression results using the split
sample IV (2nd Stage SSIV) and the unbiased split sample IV (2nd Stage USSIV) estimator.
Fee Shock Technology Shock Combined Events
Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value
Panel A. 1st Stage
Fee Shock -5.83 0.03 -7.66 0.01
Technology Shock -5.12 0.01 -8.28 0.00
Trade Size 0.27 0.23 0.27 0.24 0.26 0.25
Trades -0.01 0.10 0.00 0.16 0.00 0.12
Shares Traded 0.00 0.94 0.00 0.85 0.00 0.91
Volatility -29.87 0.00 -29.24 0.00 -29.83 0.00
Spread 37.43 0.00 36.43 0.00 35.50 0.00
Panel B. 2nd Stage SSIV
Take 2.57 0.04 13.04 0.00 6.10 0.00
Trade Size -0.30 0.48 -3.20 0.00 -1.27 0.00
Trades -0.19 0.00 -0.13 0.00 -0.17 0.00
Shares Traded 0.59 0.00 0.63 0.00 0.60 0.00
Volatility -91.90 0.47 215.48 0.12 11.54 0.93
Spread 197.24 0.00 -196.37 0.02 64.79 0.15
Panel C. 2nd Stage USSIV
Take 2.57 0.09 13.04 0.01 6.10 0.00
Trade Size -0.30 0.63 -3.20 0.39 -1.27 0.38
Trades -0.19 0.00 -0.13 0.00 -0.17 0.00
Shares Traded 0.59 0.00 0.63 0.04 0.60 0.00
Volatility -91.90 0.42 215.48 0.20 11.54 0.91
Spread 197.24 0.00 -196.37 0.29 64.79 0.44
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Table A2
Listing Descriptions
Table shows the average daily characteristics for stocks listed in different exchanges and classified as Tape
A, B, and C. Tape A are NYSE listed stocks, Tape C are NASDAQ listed stock, and all other stocks are
classified as Tape C. Panel A presents the characteristics of all the Tape A and C stocks (45,254 day-stock
observations). Panel B shows the characteristics for the Tape B stocks (1,067 day-stock observations).
All variables are defined in Table A1.
Price Volume Returns Mkt Cap
Panel A. AC Stocks
Mean 35 55 0.07 6,427
Median 27 8 0.02 1,221
25th 16 1 0.01 388
75th 43 38 0.04 3,949
St. Dev. 37 207 0.22 20,995
Panel B. B Stocks
Mean 33 0.82 0.31 267
Median 18 0.09 0.14 90
25th 11 0.01 0.05 43
75th 66 0.45 0.40 271
St. Dev. 56 3.47 0.43 469
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Table A3
Alternative Make Take Cycles
Table shows the daily characteristics of cycle durations in seconds for alternative measures of cycles.
Make1 cycles are calculated the time between the first quote that improves the limit order book after a
trade and the last quote that improves the limit order book before a trade, and Take1 is calculated as the
time difference between the first trade and the last trade in a cluster. Take2 is calculated excluding take
cycles that consist of only one trade. MakeR is the difference in time between the last trade and the first
quote, MakeR is the difference between the last quote and the first trade. The cycles are calculated by
taking the mean and the median daily cycle within stocks. Panel A presents the descriptive statistics. WS
Mean represents the cross-sectional characteristics of the within-stock mean, WS Median represents the
cross-sectional characteristics of the within-stock median. Panel B presents panel regressions of within-
stock mean make and take cycles on each other and control variables. D
(maker)
it = α
maker
i + γ
maker
t +
βmakerD
(taker)
it + δ
makerXit+ 
maker
it and D
(taker)
it = α
taker
i +γ
taker
t +β
takerD
(maker)
it + δ
takerXit+
takerit .
Panel A - Cycle Description
Make1 Take1 MakeR TakeR
WS Mean
Mean 602 23 49 40
Median 341 2 22 20
25th 107 1 9 10
75th 872 7 49 40
St. Dev. 771 245 140 110
Obs 84,879 84,970 84,874 84873
WS Median
Mean 262 7 19 14
Median 75 0 4 5
25th 20 0 1 2
75th 277 0 17 12
St. Dev. 649 220 111 86
Obs 84,879 84,870 84,874 84873
Panel B - Panel Regression
Take1 Make1 TakeR MakeR
Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat
Make 0.08 5.49 0.19 3.75
Take 0.72 4.83 0.36 5.80
Trade Size 0.08 0.56 0.52 2.12 0.01 0.32 0.00 -0.01
Trades 0.02 3.65 -0.16 -5.81 -0.01 -5.13 -0.01 -4.02
Traded Shares 0.00 -0.26 0.00 4.46 0.00 2.74 0.00 2.65
Volatility -0.25 -0.02 -154.64 -1.46 -14.51 -2.51 -44 -3.14
Spread -21.32 -2.86 296.53 8.67 22.27 4.17 58.79 6.72
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Table A5
TAQ Events Instrumental Variable Regression
Table shows the instrumental variable regression for make cycle shocks on the take cycle using TAQ data.
Make cycles are calculated as 23,400 trading seconds divided by the number of limit order book improving
quotes. Take is calculated as 23,400 trading seconds divided by the number of trades. 1st Stage presents
the result for the first-stage regression of Make Cycle on the instrument (the shock dummy variable) and
control variables and 2nd Stage presents the results for the second-stage regression, where the Take Cycle
is regressed on the Fitted Make Cycle and control variables. Panel A presents the shock to the make cycle
using Autoquote. The estimation period for Panel A is November 1, 2002 - July 31, 2003. Autoquote is a
dummy variable equal to 1 for the period after Autoquote was introduced by NYSE, and zero otherwise.
This period varies by stock from January 29, 2003 - May 27, 2003. Panel B presents the shock due to the
decrease in the minimum tick size on January 29, 2001. The estimation period for Panel B is December
1, 2000 - March 31, 2001. Tick Shock is a dummy variable equal to 1 for the period after January 29,
2001, and zero otherwise. The control variables are calculated from CRSP using end-of-day quotes and
prices: Volume is the total number of shares traded per day, Spread is the quoted spread, Volatility
is the daily returns squared, P Inv. is the inverse of price, and Mkt Cap is the market capitalization
of the stock. AP Test presents the Angrist-Pischke F-statist for weak identification and the associated
p-value, Under-Identification presents the LM statistic for the Kleibergen-Paap under-identification test
and the associated p-value, Weak-Identification and Kleibergen-Paap Wald present the Cragg-Donald
and Kleibergen-Paap F statistic for weak-identification, respectively. All regressions include firm fixed
effects and day of the week dummies. p-values in brackets are calculated using firm clustered standard
errors.
1st Stage 2nd Stage
Panel A. Autoquote
Make 6.95 (0.00)
Autoquote -60.37 (0.00)
Volume -0.02 (0.00) 0.01 (0.00)
Spread -47.32 (0.00) 449.38 (0.00)
Volatility 17.03 (0.00) -104.49 (0.00)
1/P 75.40 (0.00) -267.10 (0.00)
Mkt Cap 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.02)
AP 211.79 (0.00)
Under-Identification 201.21 (0.00)
Panel B. Tick Change
Make 4.57 (0.00)
Tick 155.66 (0.00)
Volume 0.01 (0.00) 0.04 (0.00)
Spread -53.62 (0.02) 407.82 (0.00)
Volatility -1.73 (0.74) 10.87 (0.62)
1/P 14.10 (0.30) -93.86 (0.11)
Mkt Cap 0.00 (0.52) 0.00 (0.00)
AP 138.18 (0.00)
Under-Identification 134.44 (0.00)
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Figure A2
Construction of Alternative Cycles
The figure presents the construction of alternative make and take cycles. In Panel A, make cycles are
calculated the time between the first quote that improves the limit order book after a trade and the
last quote that improves the limit order book before a trade, and take cycles are calculated as the time
difference between the first trade and the last trade in a cluster. In Panel B, make cycle, MakeR is
the difference in time between the last trade and the first quote, the take cycle, TakeR is the difference
between the last quote and the first trade.
(a) Panel A. Cycle 2
(b) Panel B. Reaction Cycles
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Figure A3
NYSE-listed Market Share (Angel et al. (2011))
The figure highlights the drop in NYSE market share of volume from 80% in 2003 to 25% in 2009 after
the introduction of Regulation NMS in 2005.
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